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Abstract 
We provide empirical evidence that increases in the periodic costs of housing lead to a larger 
supply response than price increases of the same magnitude. We rationalize this differential in 
supply responsiveness with an amplification mechanism arising from adjustments of 
capitalization rates to changes in the periodic costs. Buyers expect further periodic cost 
increases at places that have experienced a positive demand shock. We document that the 
amplification of the housing supply price elasticity is less pronounced in geographically 
constrained and tightly regulated neighborhoods and in areas having more sophisticated buyers. 
Our findings hold important lessons for public policies affecting the periodic cost of housing, 
such as rent control and housing subsidies. 
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1. Introduction 
Existing research emphasizes the importance of housing supply price elasticity for various 
economic outcomes. In fact, the responsiveness of housing supply to price signals affects, 
among other things, housing cycles, the allocation of labor across space, and the capitalization 
degree of public policies such as place-based subsidies. 1 However, we know relatively little 
about the responsiveness of housing supply with respect to changes in the periodic cost of 
housing. This strikes as surprising as urban economic theory typically focuses on periodic costs 
and many public policies – such as rent control and housing subsidies – directly act on the 
periodic price paid by households to live in a given area. In this paper, we investigate under 
which circumstances the housing supply responsiveness to changes in periodic costs differs 
from the supply responsiveness to price changes, and how this supply differential varies across 
space.  
To this end, we develop a partial equilibrium framework featuring housing supply and real 
estate capital asset markets. We show that local changes in expectations about the future growth 
of periodic housing costs and risk premia demanded by property buyers are decisive factors to 
explain differences in supply responses. Specifically, the housing supply responses to prices 
and periodic cost changes are identical if capitalization rates do not adjust to changes in the 
periodic costs. If capitalization rates do adjust to changes in periodic costs, housing supply 
price elasticities are either amplified or dampened by this adjustment. 
To bring our conceptual framework to the data, we use a unique georeferenced data set on 
advertised residential properties and building stock for Switzerland covering the 2005-2015 
period. We estimate the responsiveness of housing supply with respect to price and rent 
changes by exploiting spatial variation across small neighborhoods. By partialling out quality 
differences between rental and selling properties, we find that an increase in rents leads to an 
about twice as large supply increase than an increase of prices of the same magnitude: The 
supply response following a 10 percent increase in rents (prices) per square meter is 
approximately 13 percent (5 percent). The amplification of the supply price responsiveness is 
less pronounced in geographic constrained and tightly regulated markets, and in neighborhoods 
                                                          
1 For instance, Glaeser et al. (2008) study the role of housing supply elasticities for price dynamics, Diamond 
(2017) links the degree to which local governments can extract rents to housing supply elasticities, Kline and 
Moretti (2014) emphasize the importance of housing supply elasticity for the (distributional) effects of place-
based policies, and Hsieh and Moretti (2019) focus on the implications of housing supply constraints for the spatial 
misallocation of labor. 
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having more sophisticated buyers. These results suggest that real estate buyers do revise local 
capitalization rates downward following a positive demand shock. The adjustment is 
heterogeneous across space, thereby amplifying the housing supply response with respect to 
prices.  
Switzerland is a good laboratory to investigate housing supply due to important heterogeneity 
in the local factors influencing it. The decentralized form of government grants low-tier 
political units (municipalities) large autonomy in matters relating to land use planning, building 
permits, and fiscal policies. Geographic features of the landscape, such as elevation, slope, and 
terrain ruggedness, also vary considerably across space. These characteristics of the country 
make the reaction of housing supply contingent to localized factors. Importantly, in our setting, 
the owner-occupied and rental markets are approximately of equal size, which facilitates the 
estimation of rental and price supply elasticities throughout the country and allows us to study 
the role of capitalization rates for housing supply.2 
Recent research has investigated the implications of housing supply elasticity for various 
economic outcomes and public policies.3 Glaeser and Gottlieb (2008) argue that the most 
promising national place-based policy are those impeding highly productive areas to restrict 
their housing supply through land use restrictions. Aura and Davidoff (2008) investigate the 
role of individual versus coordinated regulatory constraints across jurisdictions for price 
dynamics. Solé-Ollé and Viladecans-Marsal (2012) show that political competition within 
local governments affects zoning of new land for residential development. Glaeser et al. (2013) 
point out that places with higher housing supply elasticities are less prone to sharp house price 
fluctuations. Hilber and Vermeulen (2016) empirically show that housing prices react more 
strongly to earnings shocks in areas where housing supply is more regulated. Using a structural 
model, Diamond (2017) argues that housing supply rigidity lowers the migration response of 
households, thereby increasing governments’ ability to extract rents via local taxes. Favilukis 
and Van Nieuwerburgh (2018) expound that welfare costs imposed by out-of-town buyers are 
larger when housing supply elasticity is lower. Hsieh and Moretti (2019) find that the spatial 
misallocation of labor due to housing supply constraints significantly lowered US economic 
growth over the long run.  
                                                          
2 Other countries with similar homeownership rates include, for example, Austria, Germany, and South Korea. 
3 See Glaeser and Gyourko (2018) for a review of the economic implications of heterogeneity in housing supply 
elasticities and Hilber (2017) for a synthesis of the implications of housing supply for the capitalization of public 
policies and amenities.  
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Our paper bridges two strands of the literature. Despite the importance of housing supply, 
research on the quantification of local housing supply price elasticities remains scarce. 
Gyourko and Molloy (2015) provide a comprehensive review of the literature investigating the 
estimation and determinants of housing supply. In his seminal article, Saiz (2010) estimates 
housing supply elasticities across US Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) as a function of 
geographic and regulatory constraints. Using a Vector Error Correction Model, Wheaton et al. 
(2014) also estimate housing supply elasticities for US MSA's, obtaining estimates in line with 
those of Saiz (2010). Recently, Baum-Snow and Han (2019) adopt a structural approach to 
quantify cross- and within-city housing supply elasticities for US metropolitan areas, showing 
that housing supply elasticities increase monotonically with the distance to city centers. We 
contribute to this literature by estimating local supply responses not only with respect to prices 
but also with respect to periodic costs, and exploring the role of constraints for both elasticities.  
The second strand of the literature focuses on real estate capital asset markets and buyers’ 
expectations. Sivitanides et al. (2001) find that capitalization rates behave similarly to 
Price/Earnings ratios, with economic agents myopically forming price growth expectations 
based on past dynamics. By constructing a user cost model incorporating economic 
fundamentals, Himmelberg et al. (2005) show that expected house price appreciation plays an 
important role in explaining local US price dynamics. Mayer and Sinai (2007) substantiate 
these findings by showing the effect of backward-looking expectations in house price booms. 
Glaeser and Nathanson (2017) construct a model where buyers are not fully rational in 
predicting future price dynamics, which explains their observed serial correlation.  
Our contribution to the literature is threefold. First, we empirically establish a link between 
housing supply responsiveness and buyers’ expectations. This link is important, as public 
policies affecting periodic housing costs might lead to unanticipated consequences in the 
supply of housing due to changes in people's expectations. Second, our empirical analysis 
quantifies the spatial dynamics of local expectations. Specifically, we provide novel evidence 
that the adaptation of buyers’ expectations occurs at the local level and that such adaptation is 
consistent with a path-dependent view of spatial development. Homebuyers expect that places 
that have gained in attractiveness will continue to do so even further in future periods, leading 
to additional development. Third, we show that housing supply elasticity varies considerably 
within and across urban areas due to the fine-scale impact of geographic and regulatory 
constraints. This variation leads to a spatially heterogeneous capitalization of global demand 
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shocks that is not observed when estimating housing supply elasticity at the urban area level, 
as done by previous research.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the conceptual 
framework motivating our empirical analysis. Section 3 presents the data, explains the data 
structure and provides descriptive statistics for the Swiss housing market. Section 4 contains 
the empirical analysis together with a discussion of the identifying assumption. Section 5 
analyses the results. Section 6 discusses the robustness checks, and Section 7 concludes.  
2. Conceptual framework 
In this section, we conceptualize the link between housing supply and the real estate asset 
market. In particular, we link housing supply price elasticity to the supply responsiveness with 
respect to periodic costs through adjustments of expectations about local rent growth and local 
risk. This link allows us to rationalize observed differences in the supply responsiveness with 
respect price and periodic cost changes.  
Our starting point is the framework by DiPasquale and Wheaton (1992), in which the economy 
is endowed with 𝑁𝑁 = ∑𝑁𝑁𝑛𝑛 households deciding in which neighborhood 𝑛𝑛 to live. Households 
pay a periodic (annual) cost 𝑅𝑅𝑛𝑛 to consume one unit of homogeneous housing in a given 
neighborhood. Buyers in the real estate asset market are willing to pay a present price 𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛 to 
earn a stream of rental income at a local capitalization rate 𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛. Housing developers are price 
takers and supply a total quantity 𝑄𝑄𝑛𝑛 of identical housing units at a unitary price 𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛. We assume 
that each local housing market clears, i.e. 𝑄𝑄𝑛𝑛 = 𝑁𝑁𝑛𝑛. Importantly, our framework is purely 
spatial in nature, such that variations in the endogenous variables, such as prices 𝑑𝑑𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛 , rents 
𝑑𝑑𝑅𝑅𝑛𝑛, and housing supply 𝑑𝑑𝑄𝑄𝑛𝑛, occur across space. 
We characterize housing supply as 𝑄𝑄𝑛𝑛 = 𝐴𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛1𝛽𝛽𝑝𝑝, where 𝐴𝐴𝑛𝑛 is a local supply shifter and 𝜖𝜖𝑄𝑄,𝑃𝑃 =
1
𝛽𝛽𝑝𝑝
 is the long-run housing supply price elasticity.4 To investigate the supply response with 
respect to rent changes, we write prices as a function of rents 𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛(𝑅𝑅𝑛𝑛) and compute the following 
rent elasticity:  
𝜖𝜖𝑄𝑄,𝑅𝑅 = 𝑅𝑅𝑛𝑛
𝑄𝑄𝑛𝑛
𝑑𝑑𝑄𝑄𝑛𝑛
𝑑𝑑𝑅𝑅𝑛𝑛
= 𝑅𝑅𝑛𝑛
𝑄𝑄𝑛𝑛
1
𝛽𝛽𝑝𝑝
𝐴𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛
1
𝛽𝛽𝑝𝑝
−1 𝑑𝑑𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛
𝑑𝑑𝑅𝑅𝑛𝑛
= 𝑅𝑅𝑛𝑛
𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛
1
𝛽𝛽𝑝𝑝
𝑑𝑑𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛
𝑑𝑑𝑅𝑅𝑛𝑛
= 𝜖𝜖𝑄𝑄,𝑃𝑃𝜖𝜖𝑃𝑃,𝑅𝑅 ,     (1) 
                                                          
4 This supply function, which is used among others by Hsieh and Moretti (2019), has the advantage to represent 
housing supply elasticity with a single structural parameter.  
5 
where 𝜖𝜖𝑃𝑃,𝑅𝑅 is the price elasticity with respect to rent changes. Equation 1 tells us that rental and 
price housing supply responses differ when the elasticity of prices to rent changes is not unitary. 
In markets where price signals amplify rental ones, i.e. 𝜖𝜖𝑃𝑃,𝑅𝑅 > 1, housing supply will respond, 
ceteris paribus, more strongly to rent changes than to price changes. An important question is 
what the determinants of the amplification coefficient 𝜖𝜖𝑃𝑃,𝑅𝑅are. To answer this question, we 
explicitly model the relationship 𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛(𝑅𝑅𝑛𝑛) between rent and prices using an asset pricing 
formula.5 
According to the Gordon growth model 𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛 = 𝑅𝑅𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛  , where 𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛 is the local capitalization rate We 
can then write 𝜖𝜖𝑃𝑃,𝑅𝑅 as 
𝜖𝜖𝑃𝑃,𝑅𝑅 = 𝑅𝑅𝑛𝑛
𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛
𝑑𝑑𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛
𝑑𝑑𝑅𝑅𝑛𝑛
= 𝑅𝑅𝑛𝑛
𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛
𝑑𝑑
𝑑𝑑𝑅𝑅𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛
�
𝑅𝑅𝑛𝑛
𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛
� = 𝑅𝑅𝑛𝑛
𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛
�
1
𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛
−
𝑅𝑅𝑛𝑛
𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛
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� = 1 − 𝜖𝜖𝑐𝑐,𝑅𝑅 ,    (2) 
where 𝜖𝜖𝑐𝑐,𝑅𝑅 is the rent elasticity of the capitalization rate to rent changes.6 In the empirical part 
of the paper, we recover 𝜖𝜖𝑐𝑐,𝑅𝑅, which according to Equation 1 is equal to 1 − 𝜖𝜖𝑄𝑄,𝑅𝑅
𝜖𝜖𝑄𝑄,𝑃𝑃. 
For interpretation purposes, it is instructive to use the fact that 𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛 = 𝑖𝑖 + 𝜋𝜋𝑛𝑛 − 𝑔𝑔𝑛𝑛, where 𝑖𝑖 is 
the countrywide risk-free interest rate, 𝜋𝜋𝑛𝑛 is a local risk premium, and 𝑔𝑔𝑛𝑛 captures expectations 
about future local rent growth. We can rewrite 𝜖𝜖𝑐𝑐,𝑅𝑅 as a function of adjustments in local risk 
and local expectations  
𝜖𝜖𝑐𝑐,𝑅𝑅 = 𝑅𝑅𝑛𝑛
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𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑛𝑛(𝑅𝑅𝑛𝑛) − 𝑑𝑑𝑔𝑔𝑛𝑛𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑛𝑛(𝑅𝑅𝑛𝑛)�,      (3) 
where we have used the fact that the risk-free rate 𝑖𝑖 doesn’t have spatial variation, i.e. 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑛𝑛(𝑅𝑅𝑛𝑛) =0. According to Equation 3, supply reacts identically to rent and price changes if investors 
consider real estate a risk-free asset (𝑑𝑑𝜋𝜋𝑛𝑛 ≡ 0) and have homogeneous growth expectation 
across space ( 𝑑𝑑𝑔𝑔𝑛𝑛
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑛𝑛(𝑅𝑅𝑛𝑛) = 0), which implies 𝜖𝜖𝑃𝑃,𝑅𝑅 = 1.7  
                                                          
5 Alternatively, we could use a standard user cost approach as suggested by Poterba (1984), in which the imputed 
periodic value of owner-occupancy equals rents. The interpretation of housing supply differences to changes in 
prices and periodic costs provided by our framework does not change.  
6 Note that Equation 2 is derived without specifying the demand/supply side of the housing market. It only belongs 
to the asset market. 
7 Note that it is not possible to empirically disentangle risk adjustments from expectation ones in Equation 3 
without imposing further structure on the way buyers form expectations and perceive risk. Even when imposing 
such structure, it might not be possible to test it empirically. To lessen this limitation, we investigate how 𝜖𝜖𝑐𝑐,𝑅𝑅 
changes across types of investors, indirectly providing evidence on changes on expectations and perceived risk.  
6 
3. Data and descriptive statistics  
The empirical analysis relies on several data sources. In this section, we summarize these data 
sources and provide descriptive statistics. Further information is available in Appendix A.  
3.1. Data sources  
Housing data – We use proprietary geo-referenced data on advertised residential properties 
provided by Meta-Sys. The data set contains approximately 2.1 million postings of rental 
properties and about 0.8 million postings of selling residences for the whole of Switzerland 
from 2004 to 2016. In addition to asking rents and prices, the data set includes comprehensive 
information on housing characteristics. The Federal Register of Buildings and Habitations 
published by the Federal Statistical Office (FSO) provides a census of the residential housing 
stock of the country. Changes in the housing stock are measured every 5 years, providing three 
time periods – 2005, 2010, and 2015 – that overlap with our advertisement data. Up to 2015, 
the register contains approximately 4.8 million housing units for the whole of Switzerland, 11.5 
percent of which were built between 2005 and 2015.  
Socio-demographic and economic data – We use the Federal Population Census of 2000 
(FSO) as well as the Population and Households Survey from 2010 to 2015 (FSO) to infer geo-
referenced homeownership rates and to obtain information on predetermined levels and 
changes in the local socio-demographic composition – i.e., nationality and language – of 
residents living in a given area. The 2000 Federal Population Census provides information on 
the type of building owner, distinguishing between institutional investors, private, and public 
owners. The FSO publishes a construction index tracking the cost evolution of material and 
labor in the construction sector for seven statistical areas.  
Regulatory and geographic data – The Land Use Statistics of Switzerland (FSO) provides 
satellite-based land cover data, allowing us to identify geographic constraints, such as lakes, 
rocks, and glaciers, and areas subject to particular regulations. Information about regulations 
on the extensive margin – and protected areas in particular – is obtained from Cantonal offices 
of spatial planning and from the Federal Office for the Environment (FOEN). Information 
about regulatory constraints on the intensive margin is inferred from municipality-level 
statistics on refusal rates provided by Meta-Sys.  
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Other data – We complement the above data with a variety of data on Swiss administrative 
units and metropolitan areas (FSO) and elevation (European Environment Agency). We 
identify the agglomerations of the 15 main cities in Switzerland, as defined by the Swiss 
Federal Statistical Office (FSO), and compute the distance of each neighborhood to the closest 
city center. The 2000 Building Census (FSO) provides information on whether a dwelling is a 
primary or secondary residence. 
Figure 1 : Rent, price, and stock dynamics 
Panel A: Major cities Panel B: Countryside 
 
Notes: Cities include the 15 main municipalities of the corresponding biggest urban areas according to 2015 
boundaries. The two panels show index growth from 2005 to 2015 of the considered variables, using 2005 as 
the base year (=100). Stock is measured as the total number of dwellings, and rents and prices are measured as 
advertised average rents and prices per square meter. 
3.2. Data structure and descriptive statistics 
We structure the data into neighborhoods by partitioning the whole territory of the country into 
small square cells of 2x2 km. We aggregate residential transactions, housing stock, socio-
demographic and economic data, and geographic and regulatory constraints within these 
neighborhoods.8 We assign each neighborhood to one of 2'324 municipalities, which represent 
the lowest governmental tier in Switzerland and have some influence on land use regulation. 
                                                          
8 Our results are robust to alternative neighborhood sizes, as discussed in Section 6. 
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At the country level, rents have increased by approximately 14 percent while prices have 
increased by approximately 35 percent.9 Over the same period, the housing stock grew by 
approximately 11 percent. Despite these general trends, stock, rent, and price dynamics are 
heterogeneous across space, as illustrated in Figure 1.10 Specifically, Figure 1 shows stock, 
rent, and price index growth in cities (Panel A) and the countryside (Panel B) from 2005 to 
2015, using 2005 as the base year (=100). Over the considered period housing stock grew 
almost twice as much in the countryside areas than in cities, hinting at the fact that in cities 
further development is hindered by a lack of developable land in conjunction with geographic 
and regulatory constraints. Given this comparatively lower responsiveness of housing 
development in cities, it is not surprising that rents and prices grew more in these areas than in 
the countryside. Interestingly, from 2007 onward rents and price dynamics have started to 
diverge considerably – with prices growing at a faster pace – which implies that capitalization 
rates have been revised downward in these locations.  
In Figure 2, we show the most important geographic and regulatory constraints for housing 
development in Switzerland. Geographic features preventing any form of development are an 
important component of the Swiss landscape. We define undevelopable land as land that is 
located above 2000 meters and whose land cover corresponds to unproductive vegetation, 
vegetation-free areas, or rocks and glaciers. Water bodies significantly reduce the amount of 
developable land in the proximity of major agglomerations, as virtually all major CBDs are 
adjacent to a lake or river.11 Undevelopable surfaces – comprising the Alps – and water bodies 
represent about 31.2 percent of the country area. 
In addition to geographic constraints, there are significant regulatory restrictions in place that 
prevent or hinder development in specific areas. We refer to measures that prevent new 
construction on undeveloped land as regulations on the extensive margin. Regulations on the 
extensive margin include forests12, UNESCO cultural or natural heritage sites, parks, and other 
                                                          
9 For new tenancy agreements market rents apply in Switzerland. To prevent abusive increases, property owners 
can adjust rents for existing tenancy agreements only if some formal criteria are met. However, several exceptions 
in the regulation allow landlords to adjust rents to local market levels. 
10 See also Web Appendix A. 
11 This is mainly due to the competitive advantage of areas in the proximity of water bodies during the Industrial 
Revolution and the subsequent urbanization of Switzerland. 
12 In response to a growing industrialization of the country, in 1876 Switzerland passed a federal law prohibiting 
further deforestation, de facto freezing forest areas to the level observed at that time. The law has remained mainly 
unchanged to the present day. As a consequence, forest areas in highly populated regions have remained 
practically unchanged since 1876. 
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high value natural amenity areas. These restrictions account for approximately 49.1 percent of 
the Swiss territory. Total restricted areas – obtained by overlapping geographic and regulatory 
constraints at the extensive margin – amount to approximately 67.3 percent of the country 
surface.   
Figure 2: Constraints to development 
 
Notes: We define geographic constraints as undevelopable land, which corresponds to plot of land located above 
2000 meter, or whose land use classification corresponds to unproductive vegetation, vegetation-free areas, or 
rocks and glaciers. With the exception of forests, red areas summarize regulatory constraints on the extensive 
margin. Swiss forests are protected areas since 1876.  
The remaining 32.7 percent of the country surface (white area in Figure 2) is available for 
development under different regulatory measures determining the intensity and type of 
residential development. We refer to these latter measures as regulations on the intensive 
margin. As a proxy for intensive margin regulation, we collected information about the building 
refusal rates at the municipal level.13 The refusal rates reflect the effective restrictiveness of 
local governments regarding residential development and show significant spatial variation, 
with an average refusal rate of 15 percent.  
                                                          
13 Cantons define zoning plans – which typically regulate the intensity of residential development – according to 
general guidelines dictated by the federal government. Municipalities have to comply with cantonal plans and 
adapt their zoning policies accordingly. However, there is no comprehensive and harmonized information about 
the type of zoning policies implemented across cantons and municipalities. 
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4. Empirical framework 
In this section, we start by illustrating the empirical specification used to estimate average 
supply responses at the country level. In a next step, we discuss the identifying assumptions 
underlying this specification. Finally, we illustrate how we estimate heterogeneous housing 
supply responsiveness at the neighborhood level.  
4.1. Estimating average housing supply elasticities 
To quantify supply responses with respect to changes in prices and periodic costs, we estimate 
the following First Difference (FD) model  
∆ ln(𝜏𝜏𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛) = 𝛼𝛼𝜏𝜏 + 𝛽𝛽𝜏𝜏∆ ln(𝑄𝑄𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛) + 𝛾𝛾𝜏𝜏𝑠𝑠𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 + 𝑢𝑢𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝜏𝜏 ,  (4) 
where 𝜏𝜏𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 represents average asking rents (𝜏𝜏 = 𝑅𝑅) or asking prices (𝜏𝜏 = 𝑃𝑃) per square meter in 
neighborhood 𝑛𝑛 at time 𝑡𝑡 , and 𝑄𝑄𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 is the total housing stock. We denote by ∆ the time 
difference between 2005 and 2015. The error term 𝑢𝑢𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝜏𝜏  captures unobserved dynamic 
components affecting housing supply. Because (4) is a FD model, local time-invariant 
unobservable at the neighborhood level are partialled out and are not contained in 𝑢𝑢𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝜏𝜏 . The 
structural parameters 𝛽𝛽𝑅𝑅 = 1/𝜖𝜖𝑄𝑄,𝑅𝑅 and 𝛽𝛽𝑃𝑃 = 1/𝜖𝜖𝑄𝑄,𝑃𝑃 represent inverse housing supply 
elasticities with respect to rent and price changes, respectively.14 In line with our conceptual 
framework, these parameters are estimated relying solely on spatial variation across 
neighborhoods and are not affected by short-term dynamics. 
The vector 𝑠𝑠𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 contains a number of supply shifters, which might affect the inverse housing 
supply function. Because dynamics of asking rents and prices per square meter might differ if 
systematic quality differences – not captured by the living surface – between rental and selling 
properties appear over time, we control for changes in average building age, average number 
of rooms, and the share of advertised single-family houses in a given neighborhood.  
To account for the impact of previous development on rent and price dynamics, we control for 
the log of the housing stock in the 1980s. According to Hilber and Robert-Nicoud (2013), the 
level of historic housing development proxies for the contemporaneous restrictiveness of land 
use regulations implemented in a given area. High-amenity areas develop first and, because of 
                                                          
14 Following Saiz (2010), we estimate inverse supply elasticities – instead of regressing quantity changes on price 
changes – because available exogenous demand shifters tend to be more relevant for quantity changes. 
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the political game played between land developers and owners of developed land, tend to adopt 
more stringent land use regulations. These stringent regulations likely have a direct impact on 
supply price dynamics. Furthermore, Saiz (2010) argues that in more developed places 
geographic constraints are more binding due to a lack of developable land. 
To control for spatial patterns in the regulatory restrictiveness of housing supply not captured 
by the historic housing stock, we partial out the distance of each neighborhood from the closest 
administrative center of one of the 15 major agglomerations. We do this because many 
suburban areas that were largely undeveloped in the 1980s have progressively become better 
connected with the CBD and have started to zone low-density residential land to attract wealthy 
taxpayers, thus imposing regulatory constraints on land developers. 
Finally, we control for geography-based supply shifters, such as elevation and terrain 
ruggedness. Within a given area, plots of land featuring geographic characteristics favorable to 
development – such as flat and non-rocky surfaces – are likely developed before those showing 
adverse geographic characteristics. Therefore, we expect unfavorable geographic features to 
increase asking rents/prices over time, as developers face higher construction costs for 
providing additional housing units on the extensive margin of existing development.  
Equilibrium changes of the housing stock ∆ ln(𝑄𝑄𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛) are endogenous via changes in the housing 
demand. Because housing demand negatively correlates with rent and price growth, we expect 
OLS estimates to be downwardly biased, thus implying overestimated supply elasticities. To 
overcome this problem, we instrument for ∆ ln(𝑄𝑄𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛) by constructing a shift-share instrument 
𝑧𝑧𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 of the eight most spoken languages in Switzerland, which in decreasing order of importance 
are German, French, Italian, Portuguese, English, Serbian, Albanian, and Spanish (remaining 
languages are included in a ninth category). These languages account for approximately 97 
percent of the Swiss population. In line with the approach suggested by Bartik (1991), we 
define the ‘Bartik language’ instrument as the weighted average of cantonal growth rates 
between 2000 and 2015 of these main spoken languages, where the weights are the 
predetermined shares of main spoken languages in a given neighborhood in 2000. Appendix B 
provides further details on the computation of the instrument.  
Because individuals tend to migrate into areas where people share the same cultural values, 
local predetermined shares of main spoken languages serve as a predictor of the spatial 
distribution of future immigration inflows as well as relocation within the country, such that 
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𝐸𝐸(∆ ln(𝑞𝑞𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛) 𝑧𝑧𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛) ≠ 0. The fact that cultural and ethnic networks play a crucial role in the 
location choice of immigrants has been documented in the literature, for example, by Altonji 
and Card (1989), Carrington et al. (1996) and Winters et al. (2001). Saiz (2007) exploits a 
similar argument, relying on the share of new immigrants relative to the initial population to 
instrument changes in the housing demand across US Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs). 
Immigration has been pronounced in Switzerland in the last decades with the residential 
population increasing by approximately 27 percent between 1980 and 2015. 
The standard identifying assumption to obtain an unbiased estimate of 𝛽𝛽𝜏𝜏 is that 𝐸𝐸(𝑧𝑧𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑢𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝜏𝜏 ) =0. Because time-invariant unobservables affecting supply prices at the local level are 
eliminated by first differencing, the instruments must be exogenous only with respect to the 
unobservable supply dynamics contained in 𝑢𝑢𝑑𝑑𝑛𝑛. Supply dynamics not controlled for in our base 
specification include changes in the factors of production of the housing sector. However, the 
cost of capital and the price of construction materials are determined at the international level, 
such that they are uncorrelated to the local dynamics of main spoken languages. 
The identifying assumption is thus not satisfied if changes in the spatial distribution of spoken 
languages affect the cost of producing housing vial labor markets. For example, if individuals 
speaking specific languages tend to supply labor in the construction industry, thereby shifting 
equilibrium wages, this causes construction costs to also change, leading to a correlation 
between 𝑧𝑧𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 and 𝑢𝑢𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝜏𝜏 . However, such a correlation seems unlikely due to the small size of the 
country. On the labor supply side, local differentials in wage dynamics tend to disappear due 
to the elasticity of labor supply via commuting flows. Put differently, if wages in the 
construction sector were to suddenly increase/decrease in a given area following a labor supply 
shock, workers can decide to supply labor elsewhere without relocating. On the labor demand 
side, the competition that characterizes the construction sector – which has very limited entry 
barriers – also makes wage dynamics homogeneous across space. To empirically test these 
claims, in Section 6 we show that our results are robust when controlling for long-run 
construction cost changes and initial price levels. Additionally, in Section 6, we show that an 
alternative instrument, which exploits a different source of variation, leads to similar results, 
therefore reinforcing our claim concerning the exogeneity of the instrument.  
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4.2. Local supply responsiveness and the role of geographic and regulatory constraints 
Equation 4 assumes that inverse supply elasticities are, on average, constant across locations. 
This assumption seems too restrictive for two reasons. First, supply elasticity in a given area 
might vary considerably according to regulatory restrictions adopted by local governments. 
According to Hilber and Robert-Nicoud (2013), attractive places are more developed and, as 
an outcome of the political game between land developers and owners of developed land, more 
regulated. To proxy for this regulation effect, we interact the housing stock level in the 1980s 
with contemporaneous stock growth. Second, in addition to regulatory restrictions we allow 
land availability to influence housing supply elasticities. However, as argued by Saiz (2010), 
geographic constraints are binding only in places where development levels are high enough. 
To investigate these propositions, we thus estimate the following equation  
∆ ln(𝜏𝜏𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛) = 𝛼𝛼𝜏𝜏 +  𝛽𝛽𝑠𝑠,𝜏𝜏∆ ln(𝑄𝑄𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛) + 𝛽𝛽ℎ𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠𝑛𝑛,𝜏𝜏∆ ln(𝑄𝑄𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛) × 𝑄𝑄𝑛𝑛1980 +  (5) 
𝛽𝛽𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝑠𝑠𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐,𝜏𝜏∆ ln(𝑄𝑄𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛) × Λ𝑛𝑛  × 𝑄𝑄𝑛𝑛1980 + 𝛾𝛾𝜏𝜏𝑠𝑠𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 +  𝑢𝑢𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝜏𝜏 ,  
where Λ𝑛𝑛 represents a given geographic/regulatory restriction in location 𝑛𝑛. We assume that 
Λ𝑛𝑛 is exogenous throughout our analysis. Note that Λ𝑛𝑛 is interacted with the historic stock 
level, thus allowing the impact of regulatory constraints to become more binding in more-
developed places. In some of our specifications, Λ𝑛𝑛 includes the sum of regulatory constraints 
on the extensive margin and geographic constraints, whereas in Saiz (2010), these two 
dimensions are specified separately. This seems reasonable in our setting, as many regulatory 
constraints prevent residential development on the extensive margin, de facto playing a role 
similar to that of the geographic constraints used in Saiz (2010). Intuitively, because geographic 
and regulatory constraints on the extensive margin limit new residential development, we 
expect 𝛽𝛽ℎ𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠𝑛𝑛,𝜏𝜏 and 𝛽𝛽𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝑠𝑠𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐,𝜏𝜏 to be positive.  
Having estimated 𝛽𝛽𝑠𝑠,𝜏𝜏, 𝛽𝛽ℎ𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠𝑛𝑛,𝜏𝜏,  and 𝛽𝛽𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝑠𝑠𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐,𝜏𝜏  for rental and selling properties, we can compute 
local supply elasticities for neighborhood 𝑛𝑛 as  
𝜖𝜖𝑛𝑛
𝑄𝑄,𝜏𝜏 = 1
𝛽𝛽𝑠𝑠,𝜏𝜏+𝛽𝛽ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑛𝑛,𝜏𝜏 𝑄𝑄𝑛𝑛1980 +𝛽𝛽𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝑠𝑠𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐,𝜏𝜏Λ𝑛𝑛×𝑄𝑄𝑛𝑛1980 , 𝜏𝜏 = 𝑅𝑅,𝑃𝑃.  (6) 
Accordingly, the estimated coefficients together with the spatial distribution of the historic 
stock 𝑄𝑄𝑛𝑛1980 and the distribution of geographic and regulatory constraints collected in Λ𝑛𝑛 
determine the local value of the supply elasticity 𝜖𝜖𝑛𝑛𝑄𝑄,𝜏𝜏.  
14 
5. Results 
5.1. Supply elasticity estimates and amplification mechanism 
Panel A of Table 1 summarizes average supply elasticity estimates with respect to rent 
(columns 1-2) and price (columns 3-4) changes, respectively. Using point estimates reported 
in columns 1 and 3 of Panel A, we obtain supply elasticities equal to ϵ𝑄𝑄,R = 1 0.7454⁄ = 1.34 
for rent and ϵ𝑄𝑄,P = 1 2.1257⁄ = 0.47 for price changes. These results suggest that, on average, 
housing supply in Switzerland is relatively elastic to rent changes, but less so with respect to 
price changes.  
Table 1: Inverse supply elasticities 
Panel A: Average supply elasticities 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
Outcome ΔLog Rent/m2  ΔLog Price/m2 
Instrument Bartik languages 
ΔLog𝑄𝑄 0.7454*** (0.2881) 0.4750** (0.2202)  2.1257*** (0.3592) 2.7845*** (0.4780) 
Kleibergen-Paap F 69.49 61.07  69.49 50.18 
Observations 2261 1419  2261 1419 
Panel B: Heterogeneous supply elasticities 
ΔLog𝑄𝑄 0.4481* (0.2674) 0.0058 (0.2236)  1.4627*** (0.3631) 1.5412*** (0.4285) 
Stock 1980 × ΔLog𝑄𝑄 0.5656*** (0.1665) 0.5153** (0.2036)  1.2609*** (0.3175) 1.2697*** (0.4825) 
Total restricted ×  
Stock 1980× ΔLog𝑄𝑄 0.2208** (0.0867) 0.1651* (0.0918)  0.4879*** (0.1738) 0.4264** (0.2011) 
Kleibergen-Paap F 19.05 11.14  19.05 13.74 
Observations 2261 1419  2261 1419 
Controls      
Supply shifters Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
ΔHousing characteristics No Yes  No Yes 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors are clustered at the 
municipality level. The units of observations are obtained by partitioning Switzerland in 2x2 km neighborhoods. 
In columns 1-4 supply shifters include elevation, elevation standard deviation, log-distance to the nearest CBD, 
log-housing stock in 1980, and total restricted areas. Total restricted area is standardized and contains constraints 
on the extensive margin – water bodies, undevelopable land, forest, and other protected areas. In columns 2 and 
4 housing characteristics include share of single-family housing and for the housing characteristics age and 
number of rooms. See Web Appendix B for detailed estimation results. Changes in housing stock ΔLog𝑄𝑄, 
including interaction terms thereof, are instrumented using a shift-share instrument for main spoken languages. 
These estimates are robust to the inclusion of housing characteristics capturing potential quality 
differences between rental and selling properties, as shown in columns 2 and 4 of Table 1A. 
Note that we lose part of the sample due to the unavailability of traded properties’ housing 
characteristics in some neighborhoods. This reduction in the number of observations reduces 
the variation in our variables, which makes the instrument comparatively less relevant.  
15 
Using average housing supply elasticity estimates, we obtain an amplification coefficient 
ϵP,R = ϵQ,R
ϵQ,P ≅ 1.340.47 ≅ 2.85, implying that for a given relative rent growth housing supply 
increases by about 2.85 times more than with respect to an equivalent price change. The 
average country response of local capitalization rates to rent changes is then ϵc,R = 1 − ϵP,R =
−1.85. According to Equation 3, this negative response of capitalization rates suggests that 
investors revise local rent growth expectations (risk premium) upward (downward) following 
an exogenous positive demand shock.15  
We now turn to the analysis of housing supply heterogeneity at the local level. Columns 1 and 
3 of Table 1B summarize the results when all relevant constraints on the extensive margin – 
including water bodies, undevelopable land, forest, and other protected areas – are considered 
together in Λ𝑛𝑛.16 As before, columns 2 and 4 show estimates of specifications accounting for 
detailed characteristics of housing units. The coefficients of the double and triple interaction 
terms, which capture local supply heterogeneity, are highly significant for rental and selling 
properties. These estimates suggest that i) historically developed places have more inelastic 
housing markets both with respect to rent and price changes, and ii) geographic and regulatory 
constraints are more binding in more-developed places.17 The double interaction coefficients 
are systematically lower for rental than selling properties, suggesting that previous 
development patterns seem to decrease the supply elasticity of selling properties to a larger 
extent than that of rental properties. 
Having estimated the coefficients 𝛽𝛽𝑠𝑠,𝜏𝜏, 𝛽𝛽ℎ𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠𝑛𝑛,𝜏𝜏, and 𝛽𝛽𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝑠𝑠𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐,𝜏𝜏 for rental and selling properties, 
we compute supply elasticities and amplification coefficients at the neighborhood level 
according to Equation 6. To facilitate the visual representation of these parameters, we 
aggregate these local supply elasticities at the municipality level by using the mean values. In 
Figure 3 we show the spatial distribution of local housing supply price elasticity 𝜖𝜖𝑛𝑛
𝑄𝑄,𝑃𝑃 (Panel 
A) and of the amplification coefficient 𝜖𝜖𝑛𝑛
𝑐𝑐,𝑅𝑅 (Panel B). 17F18  
                                                          
15 Interestingly, this result is in line with Begley et al. (2019). By simulating a dynamic model, they find that a 
positive demand shock – as captured by a higher population growth – leads to lower capitalization rates.  
16 We designate this term as “Total restricted” in Table 1B. 
17 Note that the heterogeneity arising from geographic and regulatory constraints alone is never significant. To 
compute our estimates, we always include geographic/regulatory constraints as a control, thus partialling out a 
direct effect of this variable on rent and price dynamics. 
18 We do not report the spatial distribution of 𝜖𝜖𝑛𝑛
𝑄𝑄,𝑅𝑅 as it is a function of  𝜖𝜖𝑛𝑛𝑄𝑄,𝑃𝑃 and 𝜖𝜖𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐,𝑅𝑅.  
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As apparent from Figure 3A, housing supply price elasticity varies considerably across space. 
Major agglomerations – and even more so, areas near major CBDs – are particularly inelastic. 
In contrast, countryside areas generally display comparatively higher elasticity values. 
However, this is not always true for Alpine regions. Some alpine regions have low elasticity 
values – both for rent and price changes – likely due to the importance of geographic constraints 
in conjunction with historic development.19 Concerning the spatial distribution of supply 
elasticities, Zurich and its neighboring agglomerations account for the largest area displaying 
inelastic housing supply. Even farther away from CBDs, housing supply remains fairly 
inelastic.20  
Figure 3: Local supply elasticities and amplification coefficient 
A. Prices 𝜖𝜖𝑄𝑄,𝑃𝑃 
 
B. Amplification coefficient ϵ𝑃𝑃,R 
 
Notes: Supply elasticity interval defined according to quintiles of the distribution. Local estimates are computed 
using Equation 4 for 2km side country grid data. Heterogeneity is due to the sum of relevant geographic and 
regulatory constraints on the extensive margin and due to the historic housing stock. Elasticities for cells in 
which transactions occurred only in 2005 or 2015 – which are thus not included in Equation 3 due to first 
differencing – are imputed according to their value of geographic and regulatory constraints. No data 
corresponds to municipalities whose area is not the largest relative share of a grid cell.  
Compared to US the housing supply elasticities estimated by Saiz (2010), the Swiss housing 
market is significantly less responsive to price changes. This reflects the widespread 
geographic and regulatory constraints hindering extensive margin development even in the 
countryside of the country. In Appendix C, we provide a more detailed comparison of our 
estimates with those obtained in the literature, adding further credibility to our estimates.  
                                                          
19 The municipalities of Zermatt (VS) and St. Moritz (GR), both famous ski resorts, count among the 10 percent 
most-inelastic Swiss municipalities. 
20 The distribution of both rent and price elasticities is skewed to the left. Average supply elasticities at a given 
aggregation level are thus affected by a few extremely inelastic places. Figure C1 in Appendix C shows the 
distribution of the computed elasticities. In Table C1 in Appendix C, we rank the responsiveness of housing 
markets at three different aggregation levels: cantons, agglomerations, and municipalities. 
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As shown in Figure1B, the amplification mechanism also displays considerable spatial 
heterogeneity, with values ranging from 1.82 to 3.92. Central places display the lowest value 
of 𝜖𝜖𝑛𝑛
𝑃𝑃,𝑅𝑅, whereas countryside areas the highest. This seems to suggest that following a shock to 
periodic housing costs investors adapt their expectations and risk premia more in remote areas 
than in central ones. This because attractive central places, in particular heavily 
restricted/regulated ones, already command high rent growth expectations and low risk premia. 
A positive demand shock is thus unlikely to strongly modify these expectations. On the 
contrary, investors revise their expectations substantially following a demand shock in elastic 
countryside areas, in line with the hypothesis of a path dependent view of spatial development.  
5.2. Buyers’ sophistication and local expectations 
In this section, we provide further evidence about the way buyers adjust their rent growth 
expectations and perceived risk to observed changes in the period cost of housing. To this end, 
we investigate how the local amplification coefficient 𝜖𝜖𝑛𝑛
𝑃𝑃,𝑅𝑅 varies according to buyers’ 
sophistication. We proxy such sophistication by measuring the presence of institutional 
investors – which include real estate firms, construction firms, insurers, and pension funds – 
and second-home buyers in a given neighborhood. Because these buyers are individuals and 
professional firms investing in real estate mainly to realize capital gains or benefit from rental 
income, we assume that they are more sophisticated than private buyers.21  
We proceed in two steps. First, to investigate whether the presence of sophisticated buyers 
affects the observed spatial distribution of the amplification coefficient, we estimate the 
following simple relationship: 
𝜖𝜖𝑛𝑛
𝑃𝑃,𝑅𝑅 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽𝜔𝜔𝑛𝑛 + 𝛾𝛾𝑠𝑠𝑛𝑛 + 𝑣𝑣𝑛𝑛,  (7) 
where 𝜖𝜖𝑛𝑛
𝑃𝑃,𝑅𝑅 represents the amplification coefficient in  neighborhood 𝑛𝑛, 𝜔𝜔 is either the 
predetermined share of institutional investors (𝜔𝜔 = 𝐼𝐼) or second home owners (𝜔𝜔 = 𝑂𝑂) in 
2000, and 𝑠𝑠𝑛𝑛 contains time-invariant controls including elevation, elevation standard deviation, 
log-distance to the nearest CBD, and log-housing stock in 1980. The variable 𝑣𝑣𝑛𝑛 is a stochastic 
                                                          
21 For example, second-home buyers have been found to be more sophisticated than primary home buyers 
(Bernstein et al., 2018). 
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error term. Table 2 shows the estimation results for the presence of institutional investors (Panel 
A) and second-home buyers (Panel B).  
Table 2: Investor sophistication as a determinant of heterogeneous supply elasticities 
Panel A: Share of institutional investors Panel B: Share of second-home owners 
 (1) (2)  (1) (2) 
 OLS OLS  OLS OLS 
Dependent variable Amplification effect Dependent variable Amplification effect 
Share of inst. investor -1.5706*** -0.3525*** Share of second home 0.0090 -0.0445*** 
 (0.1066) (0.0267)  (0.0253) (0.0144) 
Constant 3.0648*** 3.7159*** Constant 3.0076*** 3.6747*** 
 (0.0044) (0.0115)  (0.0071) (0.0131) 
Other controls No Yes Other controls No Yes 
R-squared 0.2930 0.8513 R-squared 0.0001 0.8175 
Observations 5054 Observations 5,168 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors are clustered at the 
municipality level. The unit of observations are obtained by partitioning the whole territory of the country in small 
square cells of 2x2 km. In columns 2 and 4 we control for elevation, elevation standard deviation, log-distance to 
the nearest CBD, and log-housing stock in 1980. 
The results in Table 2A show that a higher share of institutional investors reduces the 
amplification effect. Similarly, in Table 2B, a higher share of second home owners yields a 
lower amplification effect, albeit the reduction in the amplification coefficient is less significant 
and less pronounced compared with the role of institutional investors. Note that this analysis 
explores only variation in 𝜖𝜖𝑛𝑛
𝑃𝑃,𝑅𝑅 that stems from observable characteristics of locations as 
included in Equation 5. 
In a second step, to further substantiate the role of buyers’ sophistication, we estimate Equation 
4 with respect to price and rent changes by restricting the sample of neighborhoods according 
to the presence of institutional investors and second-home owners. We compute the 
amplification effect for each one of the restricted samples. Specifically, for the share of 
institutional investors we restrict the sample to the 50th, 75th, and 90th percentile. For the share 
of second home owners we restrict the sample to the 10th, 30th, 50th percentile. We choose 
different percentiles because the share of institutional investors is close to zero for a large part 
of the distribution.22 
To rule out the differences across subsamples that are merely driven by the fact that institutional 
investors mostly focus on agglomerations, and agglomerations display different levels of risk 
and rental growth expectations independent of the type of investors, we augment the controls 
                                                          
22 The 50th, 75th, and 90th percentile of the share of institutional investors corresponds to 0.01, 0.06, and 0.15, 
respectively. The 10th, 30th, and 50th percentile of the share of second-home owners corresponds to 0.04, 0.06, and 
0.08, respectively. 
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in Equation 4 with an interaction between the change of housing supply and the historic housing 
stock  ∆ ln(𝑄𝑄𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛) × 𝑄𝑄𝑛𝑛1980. Table 3 shows the results.  
Table 3: Amplifications effect by percentiles of investor sophistication 
Panel A: Amplification effect restricting by share of institutional investors 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Percentile inst. investor Full sample P50 P75 P90 
Amplification effect 2.85 2.95 2.28 2.06 
Amplification effect with 
interaction term 2.86 3.05 2.47 2.19 
Observations 2261 1639 906 375 
Panel B: Amplification effect restricting by share of second home owners 
Percentile second home Full sample P10 P30 P50 
Amplification effect 2.85 2.62 2.97 2.24 
Amplification effect with 
interaction term 2.86 2.65 2.97 2.22 
Observations 2261 2073 1472 881 
Notes: The regressions estimated to compute the amplification effect have standard errors that are clustered at the 
municipality level. The units of observations are obtained by partitioning the whole territory of the country in 
small square cells of 2x2 km. All the point estimates are estimated controlling for elevation, elevation standard 
deviation, log-distance to the nearest CBD, and log-housing stock in 1980. 
 
Column 1 of Table 3 shows the amplification coefficient without restricting the sample. The 
results in columns 2 to 4 of Table 3A and 3B show that the amplification effect is markedly 
lower at places with a high share of more sophisticated investors as proxied by institutional 
investors or second home investors, respectively. This holds true independently of whether we 
control for the interaction term or not. The upper 10 percent of municipalities according to their 
share of institutional investors displays a more than 50 percent lower than the corresponding 
sample mean.  
5.3. Quantifying the importance of individual geographic and regulatory constraints 
In the previous sections, we have seen that geographic and regulatory constraints do reduce the 
responsiveness of local housing supply. As shown in Figure 2, such constraints are unevenly 
distributed across the country territory. In the following, we quantify the importance of 
individual geographic/regulatory constraints at the local level.  
To quantify the importance of regulatory constraints on the extensive margin, we re-estimate 
models equivalent to Equation 5, but substitute Λ𝑛𝑛 with a specific constraint instead of 
considering all constraints together. We then evaluate local supply elasticities at the average 
value of the historical development 𝑄𝑄𝑛𝑛1980 and set the value of the respective constraint 
contained in Λ𝑛𝑛 of Equation 6 equal to its 25th and 75th quantiles, respectively. Comparing 
these two elasticities allows us to infer the impact of the constraint for an average developed 
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neighborhood. In the case of supply heterogeneity arising only due to historic development, we 
compute Equation 5 fixing Λ𝑛𝑛 = 0 and setting the housing stock in the 1980s to the 25th and 
75th quantile values. Table 4 contains the results of these computations.  
As is evident from this table, geographic constraints preventing development, although 
significant for rents, decrease supply elasticities only to a relatively small extent. On the other 
hand, the standard deviation of elevation decreases housing supply elasticities in a more 
important way, with a -11.3 percent and -10.7 percent reduction in rent and price elasticities. 
Terrain ruggedness is more important than undevelopable area, likely because in those areas 
where land availability is strongly restricted by geographic constraints, development is scarcer 
and only a few advertisements are available in our data.  
Table 4: Contributions of geographic and regulatory constraints to supply heterogeneity  
 25th 
quantile  
75th 
quantile 
% change  25th 
quantile  
75th 
quantile 
% change 
 Panel A: Rents  Panel B: Prices 
Geographic constraints        
Undevelopable 1.24 1.20 -3.60*  0.44 0.43 -1.20 
Elevation SD 1.25 1.11 -11.30*  0.45 0.40 -10.70** 
Regulatory constraints-
extensive margin        
Forests 1.16 1.05 -9.50  0.42 0.37 -11.50** 
Other protected areas  1.21 1.07 -11.10*  0.44 0.41 -6.50 
Total regulatory 1.16 0.89 -22.90**  0.42 0.34 -18.70** 
Regulatory constraints-
intensive margin        
Stock1980 a 1.62 1.23 -24.20***  0.54 0.44 -19.30*** 
Refusal rate 1.36 1.20 -11.80***  0.43 0.42 -1.40 
Total        
Total restricted (geographic + 
regulatory constraints 
extensive margin)b 1.17 0.88 -25.10** 
 
0.421 0.33 -21.10*** 
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. a Note that the historic stock serves as a proxy for the intensity of 
regulation. b Total restricted includes all geographic constraints and all regulatory constraints on the extensive 
margin. 
Regulatory constraints on the extensive margin seem to have, in general, a greater impact on 
supply elasticities, especially when all significant restrictions added together. Places whose 
total regulated area belongs to the 75th quantile of the regulation distribution, have a supply 
rent (price) elasticity that is 22.9 percent (18.7 percent) lower than those areas that belong to 
the 25th quantile of the regulation distribution. 
Intensive margin regulations also play a significant role, the most important of which is the 
level of historic development, which proxies for the intensity of current regulations. Places that 
are historically more developed display a 24.2 percent and 19.3 percent lower supply elasticity 
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with respect to rent and price changes, respectively. Refusal rates seem to matter only for rent 
changes. For price elasticities, their impact is insignificant and close to zero.23 
Finally, we consider the joint impact of geographic and extensive margin regulatory 
constraints. It makes sense to consider these two categories together, as they both prevent new 
development on the extensive margin. The combined effect is highly statistically significant 
and has the largest magnitude among all the restrictions we have investigated. Areas with more 
total restricted areas have rent (price) supply elasticities that are 25.1 percent (21.1 percent) 
lower than that of less-restricted areas. 
6. Robustness checks 
In this section, we verify the robustness of our baseline results presented in Section 5.  
6.1. Controlling for construction costs dynamics 
As pointed out in Section 4, our instrumental variable approach hinges on the assumption that 
language dynamics do not relate to unobserved rent and price dynamics via labor markets. 
Therefore, we verify the robustness of our main results when including a construction cost 
index as a control. The construction cost index we use is published by the FSO and measures 
changes in development costs for Swiss statistical areas.24 
Following Saiz (2010), we divide the cost growth observed in these regions between 2005 and 
2015 by the 2005 local level of rents/prices per square meter, which corresponds to changes in 
construction costs as a share of initial rents/prices. Despite being potentially endogenous, 
including initial rents/prices allow us to proxy for unobservable initial supply shifters in the 
rental and selling markets, respectively. Table 5 replicates the main results of Table 1.  
As it can be seen, dynamic changes in construction costs relative to initial rents/prices are 
highly significant for the two markets when not controlling for housing characteristics, but it 
does not affect our results. The robustness of our results to this inclusion supports the 
                                                          
23 A word of caution is in order concerning the impact of refusal rates. Throughout our analysis, we have assumed 
that the variable 𝛬𝛬𝑛𝑛 is exogenous to unobserved rent and price dynamics. However, despite measuring them prior 
to rent and price dynamics (from 2001 to 2004), refusal rates are potentially correlated with the error term of 
Equation 5 via anticipation mechanisms. For this reason, we exclude such regulation proxy from all other analyses.  
24 These areas are the Lake of Geneva, Espace Mittelland, Northwestern Switzerland, Zurich, East Switzerland, 
Central Switzerland, and Ticino. Note that due to high mobility and a highly integrated market variation in 
construction costs is only minor. 
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hypothesis that the labor market of the construction industry in Switzerland is relatively 
homogeneous and its dynamics do not affect our estimates of housing supply elasticities.  
Table 5: Controlling for construction cost dynamics 
Panel A: Average supply elasticities 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
Outcome ΔLog Rent/m2  ΔLog Price/m2 
Instrument Bartik languages 
ΔLog𝑄𝑄 0.7536*** (0.2876) 0.4288** (0.1851)  2.7845*** (0.4780) 2.7882*** (0.4798) 
Construction costs 0.1590*** (0.0514) 
0.0033*** 
(0.0003)  
0.9944*** 
(0.0765) 
-0.0003 
(0.0006) 
Kleibergen-Paap F 69.52 61.08  69.52 50.21 
Observations 2261 1419  2261 1419 
Panel B: Heterogeneous supply elasticities 
ΔLog𝑄𝑄 0.5277** (0.2156) -0.0637 (0.2186)  1.4706*** (0.3236) 1.5513*** (0.4275) 
Stock 1980 × ΔLog𝑄𝑄 0.6374*** (0.2108) 0.5339** (0.2374)  1.3246*** (0.3524) 1.2656*** (0.4799) 
Total restricted ×  
Stock 1980× ΔLog𝑄𝑄 0.2074** (0.1045) 0.1549 (0.1079)  0.4844*** (0.1852) 0.4273** (0.1995) 
Construction costs 0.0048*** (0.0003) 
0.0032*** 
(0.0003)  
0.9983*** 
(0.0747) 
-0.0005 
(0.0005) 
Kleibergen-Paap F 18.74 11.22  18.74 13.92 
Observations 2261 1419  2261 1419 
Controls      
Supply shifters Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
ΔHousing characteristics No Yes  No Yes 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors are clustered at the 
municipality level. The unit of observations are obtained by partitioning the Swiss 2x2 km neighborhoods. In 
columns 1-4 supply shifters include elevation, elevation standard deviation, log-distance to the nearest CBD, log-
housing stock in 1980, and total restricted area. Total restricted area is standardized and contains constraints on 
the extensive margin – water bodies, undevelopable land, forest, and other protected areas. In columns 2 and 4 
housing characteristics include share of single-family housing and for the housing characteristics age and number 
of rooms. Changes in housing stock ΔLog𝑄𝑄, including interaction terms thereof, are instrumented using a shift-
share instrument for main spoken languages. 
6.2. Alternative Instruments 
We investigate the robustness of our results when using an alternative variable to instrument 
changes in the housing demand. In line with Saiz (2007), we compute a shift-share instrument 
for the nationality of Swiss residents. To this end, we rely again on Formula B.1 in Appendix 
B but instead of considering changes in the geographic distribution of main spoken languages, 
we analyze changes in the distribution of nationality, which in decreasing order of importance 
include Switzerland, Italy, Serbia, Portugal, Germany, Spain, Turkey, France, Macedonia, 
Bosnia, Croatia (a last category includes all other nationalities). Specifically, the shares 𝑠𝑠𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛0 
in Formula B.1 are given by the share of residents in a neighborhood having a specific 
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nationality according to the 2000 population census, and 𝑔𝑔𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 is given by the corresponding 
growth of such residents at the cantonal level from 2000 to 2015. 
Table 6: Alternative instrument 
Panel A: Average supply elasticities 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
Outcome ΔLog Rent/m2  ΔLog Price/m2 
Instruments Bartik nationality 
Bartik nationality and 
languages  
Bartik 
nationality 
Bartik nationality and 
languages 
ΔLog𝑄𝑄 0.9454*** (0.2512) 0.8082*** (0.2329)  1.4165*** (0.4334) 1.9032*** (0.3245) 
Construction costs      
Kleibergen-Paap F 25.91 42.18  25.91 42.18 
Observations 2261 2261  2261 2261 
Panel B: Heterogeneous supply elasticities 
ΔLog𝑄𝑄 0.3653** (0.1784) 0.3791* (0.1993)  0.3740 (0.3185) 0.9653*** (0.2931) 
Stock 1980 × ΔLog𝑄𝑄 0.4047*** (0.1203) 0.3795*** (0.1062)  0.7304*** (0.1742) 0.6500*** (0.1498) 
Total restricted ×  
Stock 1980× ΔLog𝑄𝑄 0.1002 (0.0637) 0.1092* (0.0591)  0.1842** (0.0918) 0.1768* (0.0954) 
Kleibergen-Paap F 15.80 21.14  15.80 21.14 
Observations 2261 2261  2261 2261 
Controls      
Supply shifters Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors are clustered at the 
municipality level. The unit of observations are obtained by partitioning Switzerland in 2x2 km neighborhoods. 
In columns 1-4 supply shifters include elevation, elevation standard deviation, log-distance to the nearest CBD, 
log-housing stock in 1980, and total restricted area. Total restricted area is standardized and contains constraints 
on the extensive margin – water bodies, undevelopable land, forest, and other protected areas.  
The rationale motivating the instrument is similar to the one of the shift-share instrument based 
on languages. We expect immigrants and Swiss citizens to value the proximity to individuals 
sharing the same culture and ethnic origins, thereby shifting the housing demand in those places 
with a high share of residents having the same nationality.  
Note that the correlation between the shift-share instrument based on languages and the one 
based on nationality amounts to 0.26, implying that the two instruments exploit different 
sources of variation. We explain the low correlation as follows. First, the shift-share instrument 
based on languages is able to capture a larger variation in the dynamics of the type of residents 
with respect to the one based on nationality. In fact, Switzerland has four official languages 
(German, French, Italian, and Romansch). Additionally, Swiss citizens having immigrated 
from other countries might have a non-official language as main one. Such heterogeneity 
within Swiss citizens is not captured by the shift-share instrument based on nationality. Second, 
many foreigners of second and third generation speak a national language and are perfectly 
integrated. This also affects the corresponding growth of nationalities at the cantonal level.   
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Table 7: Inverse supply elasticities estimates using country grid data 
 Panel A: IV-second stage – country grid 1km side 
 (1) (2)   (3) (4) 
Dependent variable ΔLog Rent/m2   ΔLog Price/m2 
ΔLog𝑄𝑄 0.4567* 
(0.2539) 
-0.0526 
(0.2115)   
2.2452*** 
(0.4267) 
1.1156*** 
(0.3323) 
Stock 1980 × ΔLog𝑄𝑄  1.6806*** (0.5725)    3.6864*** (1.2706) 
Total restricted ×  
Stock 1980 × ΔLog𝑄𝑄  0.8545** (0.3808)    1.8337** (0.8022) 
Instruments Bartik languages 
Bartik 
languages   
Bartik 
languages 
Bartik 
languages 
Kleibergen-Paap F 39.45 8.22   39.45 8.22 
Observations 3,449 
 Panel B: IV-second stage – country grid 3km side 
ΔLog𝑄𝑄 0.7586*** 
(0.2172) 
0.5522*** 
(0.2143)   
2.3604*** 
(0.3241) 
2.0897*** 
(0.3367) 
Stock 1980 × ΔLog𝑄𝑄  0.3174*** (0.0783)    0.4546*** (0.1218) 
Total restricted ×  
Stock 1980 × ΔLog𝑄𝑄  0.1094** (0.0449)    0.1643** (0.0701) 
Instruments Bartik languages 
Bartik 
languages   
Bartik 
languages 
Bartik 
languages 
Kleibergen-Paap F 81.80 24.04   81.80 24.04 
Observations 1,555 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors are clustered at the 
municipality level. The unit of observations are obtained by partitioning the whole territory of the country in small 
square cells of 1x1 km for Panel A and 3x3 km for Panel B. All the point estimates are estimated controlling for 
elevation, elevation standard deviation, log-distance to the nearest CBD, and log-housing stock in 1980. Total 
restricted area is standardized and contains all relevant constraints on the extensive margin – including water 
bodies, undevelopable land, forest, and other protected areas.  
Table 6 replicates the results of Table 1 when using the shift share instrument based on 
nationality. Columns 1 and 3 report the results of Table 1 when using the alternative instrument 
alone, and columns 2 and 4 show estimation results when using the two shift-share instruments 
together. As it can be seen, the results of columns 1 and 3 of Table 6 are similar to those of the 
corresponding columns of Table 1, although the shift-share instrument based on nationality is 
weaker than the one based on languages. When using the two instruments together in columns 
2 and 4, we achieve a higher relevance of the instruments, especially when estimating average 
supply elasticities in Panel A.  
6.3. Modifiable Areal Unit Problem 
One may question the validity of our results for different definitions or areal units. More 
specifically, according to Briant et al. (2010), our point estimates of (inverse) supply elasticities 
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might vary depending on the aggregation level. We thus change the surface covered by our 
units of observation. 
We verify the robustness of our estimates by both decreasing (down to 1 km) and increasing 
(up to 3 km) the sides of the neighborhoods. Table 7 illustrates the results. The average and 
heterogeneous supply estimates for rents and prices are quite stable for both 1 km and 3 km 
side cells. Overall, the heterogeneous supply estimates for both rents and prices are a bit more 
stable for the 3 km side neighborhoods than for the 1 km side ones. This instability is probably 
fueled by the irrelevance of extensive margin constraints at the very fine scale. Put differently, 
1 km side neighborhoods in which geographic or protected areas are important probably drop 
out of our sample, as no housing transactions occur in these areas. On the other hand, 
aggregating at a higher level (3 km side) does not seem to affect the direction, magnitude, and 
statistical significance of our inverse supply elasticities much. 
7. Conclusions 
In the present paper, we investigate the response of housing supply with respect to rent and 
price changes across space. Workhorse models in urban economic theory typically feature 
periodic costs of housing, whereas the empirical literature on housing supply elasticities 
focuses on prices. This discrepancy calls for a better understanding of the empirical link 
between the responsiveness of housing supply with respect to price and rent dynamics. Our 
empirical results indicate that, on average, housing supply of the Swiss residential housing 
market reacts twice as strongly to rent changes than to price ones. We attribute this 
‘amplification effect’ to an adjustment of capitalization rates – which reflect investors’ 
expectations concerning future rent growth and risk premia – following an exogenous demand 
shock. This is consistent with path-dependent spatial development in the sense that investors 
believe that the places that grew in the past continue to be the ones that see positive demand 
growth. 
Due to geographic and regulatory constraints, we document considerable spatial heterogeneity 
in the local supply elasticity with respect to rent and price changes, respectively. Major urban 
centers and alpine tourist areas display very inelastic housing supply, whereas countryside 
areas usually have a relatively more responsive housing supply. This supply heterogeneity 
leads to significant spatial variation in the local amplification effect, which is lower in urban 
and tourist areas and higher in the countryside.  
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The spatial variation in the local amplification mechanism holds interesting insights about the 
way investors perceive and influence residential development. First, investors seem to form 
expectations regarding future rents growth and/ or assess risk premia heterogeneously across 
space and at a fine scale (neighborhood) level, which in turn influences local housing supply. 
Second, investors seem to adapt expectations and/ or risk assessments according to a path-
dependent view of residential development. Following a demand shock, they only slightly 
revise their expectations in supply-constrained places, typically represented by highly 
developed urban areas, whereas in elastic areas belonging to the countryside they revise their 
expectations significantly.  
Our results hold an important lesson for policy makers. The impact of policies aiming to affect 
the periodic cost of housing – such as housing subsidies and rent control – seem to have a much 
larger impact on housing supply than policies that act on the price of housing goods. Neglecting 
this impact might lead to severe unintended consequences for housing policies aiming to 
stimulate the housing market through the demand side.  
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A. Data Appendix 
A.1 Summary statistics 
Table A1 summarizes all variables used in our analysis. We report descriptive statistics for the 
2x2 km neighborhoods used in our benchmark specifications. Variables are classified as 
endogenous variables, instruments, controls, and moderator variables i.e. development 
constraints and type of investors. For ease of exposition, we exclusively classify the standard 
deviation of elevation and the housing stock in 1980 as controls. However, in our analysis of 
local supply elasticities based on country grid data, we also use these variables to proxy for 
geographic and regulatory constraints. 
Table A1: Descriptive statistics – country grid (n=2261) 
 2005  2015 
 Mean Min Max SD  Mean Min max SD 
Endogenous variables          
Rent (CHF/m2) 17.05 6.47 43.90 3.82  19.43 6.36 39.83 3.92 
Price (CHF/m2) 4’362 828 11’679 1’270  5’884 2’216 13’062 1’795 
Cap rate (Rent/ Price) 0.048 0.016 0.191 0.012  0.042 0.012 0.273 0.011 
Stocka (number of units) 1’393 2 33’753 2’496  1,551 2 34’294 2’631 
 Time invariant 
 Mean Min  Max SD 
Instruments          
Bartik languageb 0.09 -0.44  0.30 0.07 
Bartik nationalityb  0.07 0.00  0.57 0.05 
Controls          
Elevation (m) 600 204  2,174 228 
Elevation SDd (m) 59 1  469 57 
Distance from nearest CBD (km) 18.53 0.51  101.79 15.37 
Stock1980a (number of units) 1’024 1  30’147 2’179 
Geographic constraints          
Undevelopablee  0.04 0  0.75 0.08 
Regulatory constraints – extensive          
Forest 0.25 0  0.94 0.18 
Other regulationsc 0.15 0  1 0.30 
Total restrictedd 0.34 0  1 0.28 
Regulatory constraints – intensive           
Refusal rate 0.15 0  1 0.3 
Type of buyers (in 2000)      
Share of institutional investors 0.07 0  0.65 0.08 
Share of second-home buyers 0.10 0  0.81 0.11 
Notes: a Measured as the number of individual housing units. Note that the historic stock also serves as a proxy 
for the intensity of regulation. b Because Bartik instruments are weighted growth rates, they do not have physical 
units.  c Share of children up to five years old in the year 1990 at the municipality level. d SD=standard deviation. 
e Share of water bodies and undevelopable land within the cell. c Other regulations include parks, UNESCO areas, 
and BLN restrictions. d Computed as the sum of geographic and regulatory constraints on the extensive margin. 
The sample is restricted to units of observations for which rents and prices per square meter are available both in 
2005 and 2015. The number of observations for refusal rate is lower (2215 obs.) due to missing values. 
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A.2 Housing advertisements 
Advertisement data for rental and selling properties were provided by Meta-Sys, an information 
provider. By gathering daily advertisements from virtually all real estate platforms in 
Switzerland, the proprietary data set consists of approximately 2.1 million postings of rental 
housing units and 0.8 million postings of selling properties from 2004 to 2016. Importantly, 
Meta-Sys cleans the data from cross-platform duplicates such that each advertised housing unit 
is counted only once in the data. Table A2 illustrates the main variables contained in the data 
set. 
Table A2: Housing advertisements 
Variable Units Description 
x-coordinate WGS-1984 x-coordinate of the residence 
y-coordinate WGS-1984 y-coordinate of the residence 
Rent CHF Asking rent per month including additional costs. Used to compute the rent per square meter.  
House price CHF Asking price. Used to compute the house prices per square meter. 
Floor space m2 Floor space of residence. Used to compute the rents/house prices per square meter. 
Rent per square 
meter CHF/m2 Monthly asking rent per square meter of floor space. 
House price per 
square meter CHF/m2 Asking price per square meter of floor space. 
Building period Year Year the residence was built. This variable is missing for about 50 percent of the observations. 
Approximately 10 percent of the advertisements do not have precise geo-coordinates. Only a 
particular “geographical center” is available for these observations, such as the municipality, 
canton, or country centroid. Since our analysis relies on precise geo-coordinates, we drop these 
advertisements.  
Additionally, we lose observations when computing rents or house prices per square meter, 
since not all advertisements contain information on the floor space of the housing unit. Our 
final data set comprises approximately 1.6 million postings of rental properties and 
approximately 0.65 million postings of selling properties. These postings are aggregated over 
our within-agglomeration sample, each country-grid cell, and municipalities in 2004-2005, 
2009-2010, and 2014-2015. 
A.3 Federal Register of Buildings and Habitations (GWR) 
The Federal Register of Buildings and Habitations takes a census of the entire residential 
housing stock of Switzerland. Two features of the data set are worth noting. First, each building 
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is georeferenced. Second, the register contains information on the housing stock spanning the 
last century. The precise construction year is missing for many buildings, but the FSO attributes 
a specific construction period to all of them. These time intervals are large for early periods 
(1919 or older, 1919-1945, and 1945-1960, 1960-1970, and 1970-1980). From the 1980s, the 
building period is recorded every five years. We aggregate data on the housing stock for our 
within-agglomeration sample, country-grid cells, and municipalities in the periods 1980, 2005, 
2010, and 2015. Table A3 describes the variables used from the building register. 
Table A3: Federal register of buildings and habitations 
Variable Units Description 
x-coordinate WGS-1984 x-coordinate of the building 
y-coordinate WGS-1984 y-coordinate of the building 
Building year Year Year a building was built. This variable is missing for about 50 percent of the observations. 
Ground floor 
area m2 Ground floor area of building.  
Habitation floor 
area m2 Floor area of each habitation. 
Type Category Single-family, attached/flats, mixed-use (residential and commercial) 
 
A.4 Federal Population Census and the Population and Households Survey 
Table A4: Households characteristics 
Variable Units Description 
x-coordinate WGS-1984 x-coordinate of residence 
y-coordinate WGS-1984 y-coordinate of residence 
Nationality Country code Nationality of individuals. Each country has a different country code. Used to compute the shift-share instrument for nationality. 
Language Language code 
Main language spoken at home. Each language has a different language 
code. Used to compute the shift-share instrument for languages. 
Homeownership Dummy 
Dummy variable. 1 if an individual is a home owner, 0 if not. Used to 
compute the home ownership rate in 2000 and to impute the 
homeownership rate in 2005, 2010, and 2015. 
Information on households’ socio-demographic characteristics is provided by the Federal 
Population Census (FPC) and the Population and Households Survey (STATPOP). The FPC is 
a census of the Swiss population that was conducted with decadal frequency until 2000. From 
2010 onward, STATPOP replaced the census. Each year, STATPOP consists of a 
representative sample of at least 200,000 households. Both data sources share common 
information on household characteristics such as housing expenditure and tenure mode, 
employment, mobility, education, language and religion. Table A4 describes the variables used 
in this study. 
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Because the FPC provides geo-coded information for the entire Swiss population, we can 
compute precise homeownership rates in 2000 for our within-agglomeration sample, for each 
country-grid cell, and for municipalities. Due to the limited sample size of STATPOP, this is 
not possible in the following years. Therefore, we impute homeownership rates as follows. 
First, STATPOP allows us to compute reliable homeownership rates at the district level in 2015 
(districts are composed of several municipalities). Using the FSO 2015 definition of districts, 
we compute the corresponding homeownership rates in 2000 at the district level. Second, we 
compute the growth rate in homeownership at the district level between 2000 and 2015. Using 
a linear interpolation, we then impute homeownership growth rates for the periods 2000-2005 
and 2000-2010. Finally, we multiply the initial homeownership rates in 2000 at a given level 
(within-agglomeration, country-grid, or municipality) with the computed growth rates, thus 
obtaining the imputed homeownership rates in 2005, 2010, and 2015 at each of the considered 
levels. 
A.5  Regulatory Constraints  
Table A5: Supply constraints 
Type of heterogeneity Label Description 
Area share 
of 
Switzerland 
Source 
Panel A: Geographic constraints 
Water and undevelopable land Undevelopable  
Water bodies + rocks, 
and glaciers  
above 2000 
31.2% 
 Land Use 
Statistics of 
Switzerland 
Standard deviation of elevation 
(land ruggedness) Elevation SD Within grid cells of 2 km - 
 Land Use 
Statistics of 
Switzerland 
Panel B: Regulatory constraints - extensive margin 
Forests Forest Protected forest 27.5% 
 Land Use 
Statistics of 
Switzerland 
Other protected areas Other protected areas 
BLN, Parks, UNESCO 
cultural and natural 30.7% 
Federal Office 
for the 
Environment 
(FOEN) 
Panel C: Regulatory constraints - intensive margin 
Intensity of regulation Stock1980  
Proxy for the intensity of 
regulation (cf. Saiz, 
2010) 
- 
Federal 
Register of 
Buildings and 
Habitations 
(GWR) 
Building permits refusal rate Refusal rate 
Share of building 
permits that were 
rejected 
- Meta-Sys 
Panel D: Total restricted area 
Geographic + extensive margin 
regulatory constraints 
Total 
restricted   67.3%  
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Table A5 summarizes the protected areas, as well as the corresponding data sources, used in 
the present study. One of the objectives of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and 
Cultural Organization (UNESCO) is to protect cultural and natural heritage of outstanding 
universal value. Currently, UNESCO recognizes 981 cultural or natural heritage sites 
worldwide, 11 of which are located in Switzerland. These areas mostly consist of buildings of 
particular architectural interest, historic towns, and areas with valuable natural amenities.  
The Federal Inventory of Landscapes and Natural History (BLN) classifies the most typical 
and most valuable landscapes of Switzerland. The aim of the inventory – which was 
progressively introduced from 1977 to 1998 – is to protect Switzerland's scenic diversity and 
to ensure that the distinctive features of these landscapes are preserved.  
Finally, parks of national importance are characterized by beautiful landscapes, rich 
biodiversity and high-quality cultural assets. Municipalities and cantons preserve these values 
and ensure their sustainment for the economic and social development of their regions. 
Figure A5: UNESCO, BLN, and Parks 
 
Notes: Data source: FOEN. Own graph. With the exception of lakes, colored areas corresponding to extensive 
margin regulations may overlap.   
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B. Shift-share instrument of main spoken languages 
Following Bartik (1991), we compute the shift-share instrument of main spoken language 
according to the following formula 
𝑧𝑧𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = ∑ 𝑓𝑓𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛0𝑓𝑓𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛0𝐽𝐽𝑛𝑛=1 𝑓𝑓𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛−𝑓𝑓𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛0𝑓𝑓𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛0 = ∑ 𝑠𝑠𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛0𝐽𝐽𝑛𝑛=1 𝑔𝑔𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛, (B.1) 
where 𝑓𝑓𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛0 and 𝑓𝑓𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛0  represent the number of residents speaking language 𝑗𝑗 within 
neighborhood 𝑛𝑛 and canton 𝑐𝑐 at time 𝑡𝑡0, respectively. Let 𝑓𝑓𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛0 denote the total number of 
residents living in neighborhood 𝑛𝑛 at time 𝑡𝑡0, and 𝑡𝑡 define the time interval over which we 
compute the growth of a given language since 𝑡𝑡0. Therefore, 𝑠𝑠𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛0 = 𝑓𝑓𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛0𝑓𝑓𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛0  is the share of 
residents speaking a main spoken language in neighborhood n at time 𝑡𝑡0 and 𝑔𝑔𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = 𝑓𝑓𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛−𝑓𝑓𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛0𝑓𝑓𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛0  
is the corresponding growth rate of that language at the cantonal level over [𝑡𝑡, 𝑡𝑡0]. To 
implement Formula B.1, we use the share of the eight most spoken language in Switzerland 
according to the 2000 population census (remaining languages are included in a ninth 
category), and compute the corresponding growth of these languages at the cantonal level from 
2000 to 2015.  
Recently, while mainly focusing on labor markets and industrial composition, a number of 
papers investigating the econometric assumptions necessary for the validity of Bartik 
instruments has emerged.25  To summarize, these papers argue that Bartik instruments are valid 
if either i) initial shares are independent and randomly assigned across observations, which is 
likely if the number of initial shares is high, or ii) initial shares are endogenous but growth 
shocks occur randomly across regions. As argued in the main text, in our setting both initial 
language shares in a neighborhood and language growth shocks at the cantonal level are 
exogenous with respect to local rent and price dynamics. We support this claim with the 
robustness checks presented in Section 6.  
  
                                                          
25 See, for example, and Borusyak et al. (2018), Adão et al. (2018), and Goldsmith-Pinkham et al. (2018). 
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C. Assessing Housing Supply Elasticity Estimates 
In this section, we aggregate neighborhood-level housing supply elasticity estimates obtained 
from Equation 6 at the municipal, agglomeration, and cantonal level and provide a ranking of 
the most inelastic areas. In a next step, we compare these housing supply elasticity estimates 
to other estimates provided in the literature.  
C.1 Ranking housing supply elasticities  
Table C1 contains a ranking of different units, from most to least inelastic, according to their 
housing supply responsiveness with respect to rent and price changes, respectively. These units 
correspond to three levels of aggregation: cantons, urban areas, and municipalities. Cantons 
and municipalities are second and third tier political units in Switzerland, whereas urban areas 
are defined by the FSO. Note that the ranking for the three levels of aggregation is virtually the 
same with respect to rent and price changes, such that we do not distinguish between the two 
changes in the following discussion.  
Columns 1-3 of Table C1 show the ranking for Cantons. Except for Basel City, all cantons 
feature a rental supply elasticity above one. Unsurprisingly, Basel City, Zurich, and Geneva 
appear in the top five most inelastic cantons. In fact, these cantons are among the most 
urbanized ones in Switzerland, and, additionally, housing markets of Geneva and Basel City 
are constrained by country boundaries. The presence of Ticino and Basel-Landschaft in the 
upper part of the ranking is justified by the fact that terrain ruggedness and forests play a major 
role in constraining housing supply in these cantons. The most-elastic cantons are Obwalden, 
Uri, Appenzell Innerrhoden, Fribourg, and Jura. In contrast to the most-inelastic cantons, these 
five cantons are characterized by a lower degree of urbanization and a comparatively lower 
degree of regulatory constraints.  
Columns 4-6 of Table C1 illustrate the supply elasticity ranking of the 15 largest Swiss 
agglomerations. Note that all agglomerations feature a rental supply responsiveness above one. 
The agglomeration of Baden-Brugg is the most inelastic, whereas the agglomerations of Basel 
and Geneva rank only eighth and ninth, respectively. Lugano is the second most inelastic major 
agglomeration in Switzerland. This is hardly surprising, as its agglomeration area is constrained 
by the Lugano Lake and the surrounding hills. Zurich also counts among the most-inelastic 
agglomerations. We interpret this ranking of agglomerations with due caution, because the 
definition of the boundaries of a given agglomeration seems to be arbitrary with respect to rent 
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and price dynamics, as shown in Figure W-A1. For example, the FSO defines the 
agglomeration of Baden-Brugg by a relatively small surface that closely surrounds the 
respective city centers. Therefore, it is not surprising that this agglomeration displays lower 
supply elasticities than that of Zurich, which has a considerably larger surface. Similarly, the 
agglomeration of Geneva and Lausanne incorporates countryside areas that make the aggregate 
supply elasticity considerably more elastic.  
Table C1: Ranking by supply elasticities 
(1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6)  (7) (8) (9) 
Cantons  Agglomerations  Municipalities 
Rank Rents Prices  Rank Rents Prices  Rank Rents Prices 
BS .66 .25  Baden Brugg 1.04 .37  Geneva (GE) .2 .11 
ZH 1.54 .48  Lugano 1.32 .43  Basel (BS) .24 .13 
BL 1.62 .49  Zurich 1.44 .46  Brügg (BE) .27 .14 
GE 1.62 .49  Biel/Bienne 1.47 .46  Thalwil (ZH) .33 .16 
TI 1.65 .5  Neuchâtel 1.5 .46  Zurich (ZH) .34 .17 
AG 1.73 .52  Winterthur 1.51 .47  Bern (BE) .35 .17 
ZG 1.76 .52  Olten Zofingen 1.53 .48  Adliswil (ZH) .36 .17 
VS 1.81 .53  Basel  1.59 .49  Vevey (VD) .4 .18 
SO 1.82 .54  Geneva 1.69 .51  Pully (VD) .42 .2 
SH 1.86 .54  Lucerne 1.7 .5  Schlieren (ZH) .42 .2 
NE 1.89 .54  Bern 1.75 .52     
NW 1.89 .54  Zug 1.79 .53  .   
AR 1.89 .55  St. Gallen 1.8 .53  .   
BE 1.9 .55  Lausanne 1.92 .55  .   
SG 1.92 .55  Fribourg 2 .56     
GL 1.93 .55         
VD 1.94 .55      Villeret (BE) 2.45 .63 
SZ 1.98 .56      Fieschertal (VS) 2.46 .63 
TG 1.99 .57      Missy (VD) 2.46 .63 
GR 2 .56      Lugnez (JU) 2.47 .63 
LU 2.02 .57      Ependes (VD) 2.48 .64 
OW 2.03 .57      Ergisch (VS) 2.49 .64 
UR 2.06 .57      Frasco (TI) 2.49 .64 
AI 2.11 .59      Isone (TI) 2.49 .64 
FR 2.13 .59      Steinerberg (SZ) 2.49 .64 
JU 2.17 .59      Zwischbergen (VS) 2.49 .64 
Finally, columns 7-9 of Table C1 show the supply elasticity ranking of municipalities. To save 
space, we only report the 10 most inelastic and the 10 most elastic municipalities. Among the 
most-inelastic areas are major urban municipalities such as Geneva (GE), Basel (BS), Zurich 
37 
(ZH) and Bern (BE). Thalwil (ZH), Adliswil (ZH), and Schlieren (ZH) are suburban areas 
located within the proximity of the municipality of Zurich. Similarly, Pully (VD) is a suburban 
municipality near Lausanne. Finally, Vevey (VD) is a fairly urbanized town on Lake Geneva, 
and Brügg (BE) is a municipality that is highly constrained by regulatory constraints on the 
extensive margin. In contrast, the ten most elastic municipalities are mostly located in remote 
areas displaying large land availability and few geographic/regulatory constraints. 
C.2 Comparison with estimates provided in the literature  
We compare our estimated price supply elasticities with those obtained by Saiz (2010) and 
Caldera and Johansson (2013).26 We focus on these two papers for the following reasons. 
Because our methodological approach is mainly based on Saiz (2010), we can investigate how 
housing supply elasticities computed for major US metropolitan areas generalize to the case of 
Switzerland. On the other hand, despite adopting a completely different approach that relies on 
country-level time series data to estimate a system of simultaneous demand-supply equations, 
Caldera and Johansson (2013) provide an average supply elasticity for Switzerland. To the best 
of the author’s knowledge, this is the only paper providing such an estimate.  
Saiz (2010) finds an average supply elasticity of 1.54 (=1/0.65) for US metropolitan areas when 
heterogeneity is not considered, suggesting that US metropolitan areas are almost three times 
more elastic as Switzerland’s 15 largest agglomerations, which have an average supply 
elasticity of 0.49 without heterogeneous effects.27 Because we obtain a similar value of 0.47 
for the average supply elasticity for the whole of Switzerland, which equals 0.47, the difference 
between the two elasticities does not hinge on the definition of Swiss agglomerations. When 
considering housing supply heterogeneity with respect to prices, we also observe differences 
with Saiz (2010). Taking into account geographic and regulatory constraints, housing supply 
elasticities of US Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) vary between 0.6 in Miami (FL) and 
5.45 in Wichita (KS). As shown in Table C1, for Switzerland we obtain supply elasticities 
estimates ranging from 0.25 and 0.59 at the cantonal level, from 0.37 to 0.56 for major 
agglomerations, and from 0.11 to 0.64 at the municipal level.  
                                                          
26 Because the literature has focused on the estimation of supply elasticity relative to price changes, in what follows 
we do not discuss our supply elasticity estimates with respect to rent changes. 
27 We compute this value by averaging the elasticities of column 6 in Table C1.  
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We impute this difference to two factors. The first factor is the vast difference in the 
aggregation level of the units of observation used in the two empirical analyses. Saiz (2010) 
works at a more aggregate level: the smallest US MSA is much larger in terms of area, 
population, and housing transactions than any 2x2 km cell in our country grid data. The 
aggregation level, in turn, strongly affects the variation across units of observations. It is 
reasonable to assume that there is vast supply heterogeneity within US MSAs that is eliminated 
by aggregating data for these areas. As shown in Figure C1, in the case of Switzerland we do 
see that there is considerable dispersion in supply elasticity estimates across neighborhood, 
with a few places having extremely inelastic housing supply.  
Figure C1: Distribution of local supply elasticity 
 
As shown in Table C1, the distribution of supply price elasticities changes according to the 
aggregation level, with lower and higher values becoming more uncommon at a higher level 
of aggregation (i.e., the variance of the estimates decreases).28  
The second factor is the difference in the magnitude of geographic and regulatory constraints 
of the two countries. As illustrated in Figure 2, Switzerland’s geographic and regulatory 
constraints hindering extensive margin development are extremely widespread across the 
country’s territory, making housing supply inelastic by international comparison even in 
                                                          
28 Despite working at a more aggregate geographical level, Saiz (2010) supply elasticities vary to larger degree 
than in our case. The main reason for this larger variance is likely due to the fact that his units of observation (U.S. 
MSAs) represent a small share of the country surface and of the state in which they are located.  
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countryside areas. With the exception of a few extremely constrained MSAs, in the US there 
are ample quantities of open land are still available for residential development.  
Interestingly, Caldera and Johansson (2013) find that Switzerland has the lowest supply price 
elasticity among a panel of 21 OECD countries, with an average supply elasticity of 0.15 with 
respect to price changes. Their estimate is similar to the supply elasticity estimates of the most 
inelastic municipalities. Indeed, besides differences in the magnitude due to the methodological 
approach, we argue that the estimate computed by Caldera and Johansson (2013) is strongly 
influenced by core municipalities located in Swiss cities. In fact, Caldera and Johansson (2013) 
use countrywide price indices whose dynamics are driven by core cities – such as Geneva, 
Zurich, Lausanne, Basel and Bern – as these are the places where most properties are 
transacted.  
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Web Appendix A. The Swiss Housing Market 
In this section, we provide complementary information on the Swiss housing market. Figure 
W-A1 shows the country and cantonal boundaries, as well as the 15 major agglomerations in 
2015 according to the Federal Statistical Office (FSO).  
Figure W-A1: Major Swiss agglomerations in 2015 
 
Unsurprisingly, in 2015, the larger part of the housing stock was concentrated in major 
agglomerations. Approximately 46 percent of the country’s housing stock was located within 
10 km of one of the 15 largest CBDs. Neighborhoods (2x2km square cells) located within these 
urban areas display the highest housing stock density in 2015, as illustrated in Panel A of Figure 
W-A2.  
Figure W-A2: Housing stock 
A. Housing stock in 2015 
 
B. Housing stock growth 2005-2015 
 
Notes: Data source: GWR. Number of residential buildings per grid cell. Range is according to quintiles. Grid 
cells are of size 2x2 km, which corresponds to 4 square km. The total number of grid cells is 10,332. 
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Areas without/ with a few buildings are typically located in the Alps, where residential 
development is hindered by steep slopes, terrain ruggedness, bad soil quality, and a lack of 
accessibility. Interestingly, as shown in Panel B of Figure W-A2 over the period of our analysis 
(2005-2015) the housing stock has markedly increased in suburban and countryside areas, 
growing at a lower rate within the proximity of the CBDs.29 In more remote alpine areas, the 
stock remained unchanged or even decreased due to demolitions.  
According to Panel A of Figure W-A3, rents per square meter are particularly high in major 
Swiss agglomerations, with Zurich-Zug and the Lemanic Arc – defined as the union of the 
agglomerations of Geneva and Lausanne – having the flattest rent gradient from their 
administrative centers. Smaller central business districts (CBDs) – such as Bern, Basel, or 
Lugano – display the steepest rent gradients, implying that more affordable rents can be found 
at a smaller distance from the city centers compared to larger agglomerations such as Zurich 
and Geneva. With the exception of a few sparse areas, rents have considerably increased 
throughout the Swiss territory, with higher increases within urban agglomerations than in rural 
areas, as shown in Panel B of Figure W-A3. 
Figure W-A3: Asking rents 
A. Rent in 2015 
 
B. Rent growth 2005-2015 
 
Notes: Data source: Meta-Sys. Asking rents and prices in CHF per square meter. The range is according to 
quintiles. Grid cells are of size 2x2 km, which corresponds to 4 square km. The total number of grid cells is 
10’332.  
As illustrated in Panel A of Figure W-A4, the gradient of asking price per square meter is 
steeper than that for rents, with Zurich-Zug-Luzern and the Lemanic Arc representing the areas 
of the market with the highest prices. Similar to rents, prices have increased across the whole 
                                                          
29 The share of housing stock within 5 km of the CBDs decreased from 30 percent in 2005 to 29.6 percent in 2015 
despite the efforts to contain urban sprawl.  
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country, with only a few locations displaying a negative price growth, as shown in Panel B of 
Figure W-A4.  
Figure W-A4: Asking prices 
A. Price in 2015 
 
B. Price growth 2005-2015 
 
Notes: Data source: Meta-Sys. Asking rents and prices in CHF per square meter. The range is according to 
quintiles. Grid cells are of size 2x2 km, which corresponds to 4 square km. The total number of grid cells is 
10’332.  
Observed differences in rents, price, and stock dynamics are due, in part, to a mix of demand-
side shocks varying at the national and local levels. At the national level, for example, mortgage 
interest rates have persistently decreased over the last ten years, with 10-year fixed rates falling 
below 1.5 percent.  
Figure W-A5: Foreign residents 
A. Spatial distribution in 2015 
 
B. Country time trend 
 
Notes: Data source Panel A: STATPOP. Range is according to quintiles. Grid cells are of size 2x2 km. The 
total number of grid cells is 10,332. Data source Panel B: GWR and Statistik des jährlichen 
Bevölkerungsstandes (ESOP). Own computations and figure. 
 
The Swiss population has grown at a sustained rate in the last few decades, going from fewer 
than 6.5 million inhabitants at the beginning of the 1980s to approximately 8.3 million in 2015. 
However, as illustrated in Panel A of Figure W-A5, the important immigration inflow is 
unevenly distributed across space. Foreign shares tend to be particularly high in neighborhoods 
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within/near major urban areas and in high-amenity places within the proximity of lakes or ski 
resorts. In contrast, countryside areas usually have low foreign shares. As shown in Panel B of 
Figure W-A5 the population growth of the country is mostly driven by immigration, as the total 
population and number of foreign residents follow parallel trends. As expected, the housing 
stock grew parallel to the population growth. 
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Web Appendix B. Detailed Estimation Results 
Table W-B1 is structured in the same way as Table 1 in the main text and shows the results of 
the corresponding OLS estimates. As expected, due to the simultaneity of changes in local 
prices/rents and changes in the local stock of housing the point estimates of the OLS 
specifications display a substantial downward bias compared to the IV estimates in Table 1. 
This results in overestimating the local supply elasticities with respect to price and rent 
changes. 
Table W-B1: Inverse supply elasticities – OLS estimates of Table 1 
Panel A: Average supply elasticities 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
Outcome ΔLog Rent/m2  ΔLog Price/m2 
ΔLog𝑄𝑄 0.1523*** (0.0329) 0.1189*** (0.0397)  0.2749*** (0.0503) 0.2879*** (0.0589) 
Observations 2261 1419  2261 1419 
Panel B: Heterogeneous supply elasticities 
ΔLog𝑄𝑄 0.1408*** (0.0407) 0.1168** (0.0522)  0.2227*** (0.0550) 0.2712*** (0.0594) 
Stock 1980 × ΔLog𝑄𝑄 0.0224 (0.0386) 0.0006 (0.0350)  0.1225* (0.0678) 0.0123 (0.0581) 
Total restricted ×  
Stock 1980× ΔLog𝑄𝑄 -0.0055 (0.0299) -0.0227 (0.0260)  -0.0071 (0.0608) -0.0714 (0.0522) 
Observations 2261 1419  2261 1419 
Controls      
Supply shifters Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
ΔHousing characteristics No Yes  No Yes 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors are clustered at the 
municipality level. The units of observations are obtained by partitioning Switzerland in 2x2 km neighborhoods. 
In columns 1-4 supply shifters include elevation, elevation standard deviation, log-distance to the nearest CBD, 
log-housing stock in 1980, and total restricted areas. Total restricted area is standardized and contains constraints 
on the extensive margin – water bodies, undevelopable land, forest, and other protected areas. In columns 2 and 
4 housing characteristics include share of single-family housing and for the housing characteristics age and 
number of rooms.  
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Table W-B2 and W-B3 replicate the IV results of Table 1 in the main text and show the 
coefficients for all controls which are not reported in Table 1. Table W-B2 corresponds to the 
average supply elasticities (Panel A of Table 1), including first stage results. Table W-B3A 
reports second stage estimates of heterogeneous supply responses (Panel B of Table 1), 
whereas in Table W-B3B we report the corresponding first stages.  
  
Table WB - 2: Average supply elasticity (2005-2015) – Panel A of Table 1 
Panel A: Average supply elasticities 
Second stage IV 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
Outcome ΔLog Rent/m2  ΔLog Price/m2 
Instrument Bartik languages 
ΔLog𝑄𝑄 0.7454*** 0.4750**  2.1257*** 2.7845*** (0.2881) (0.2202)  (0.3592) (0.4780) 
Elevation 0.0498* 0.0384  0.1826*** 0.2692*** (0.0295) (0.0296)  (0.0395) (0.0683) 
Elevation SD 0.0806 0.1460*  0.2963** 0.6760*** (0.0969) (0.0855)  (0.1466) (0.2113) 
Log-distance CBD -0.0030 0.0000  -0.0274*** -0.0311*** (0.0057) (0.0045)  (0.0091) (0.0098) 
Log-housing stock 1980 0.0169*** 0.0177***  0.0261*** 0.0626*** (0.0040) (0.0045)  (0.0060) (0.0119) 
ΔShare of single family housing  0.0130***   0.0414*  (0.0049)   (0.0222) 
ΔNr. of rooms  -0.2026***   0.0960  (0.0445)   (0.0725) 
ΔAge  -0.0081   0.0159  (0.0064)   (0.0123) 
Constant -0.0908 -0.0646  -0.1904** -0.5765*** (0.0640) (0.0632)  (0.0813) (0.1571) 
Kleibergen-Paap F 69.49 61.07  69.49 50.18 
Observations 2261 1419  2261 1419 
First stage 
Outcome ΔLog𝑄𝑄  ΔLog𝑄𝑄 
Bartik Languages 0.2457*** 0.2962***  0.2457*** 0.2589*** (0.0295) (0.0379)  (0.0295) (0.0365) 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors are clustered at the 
municipality level. The unit of observations are obtained by partitioning the whole territory of the country in small 
square cells of 2x2 km.   
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Table WB - 3A: Heterogeneous supply elasticities (2005-2015)   
Second stage of Panel B of Table 1  
Panel B: Heterogeneous supply elasticities 
Second stage IV 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
Outcome ΔLog Rent/m2  ΔLog Price/m2 
Instrument Bartik languages 
ΔLog𝑄𝑄 0.4481* 0.0058  1.4627*** 1.5412*** (0.2674) (0.2236)  (0.3631) (0.4285) 
Stock 1980 × ΔLog𝑄𝑄 0.5656*** 0.5153**  1.2609*** 1.2697*** (0.1665) (0.2036)  (0.3175) (0.4825) 
Total restricted ×  
Stock 1980× ΔLog𝑄𝑄 0.2208** 0.1651*  0.4879*** 0.4264** (0.0867) (0.0918)  (0.1738) (0.2011) 
Elevation 0.0380 0.0305  0.1552*** 0.2429*** (0.0294) (0.0291)  (0.0389) (0.0626) 
Elevation SD 0.0245 0.0528  0.0902 0.3420** (0.0989) (0.0834)  (0.1400) (0.1681) 
Log-distance CBD 0.0061 0.0081*  -0.0059 -0.0095 (0.0056) (0.0048)  (0.0097) (0.0108) 
Log-housing stock 1980 -0.0210* -0.0301*  -0.0567*** -0.0553 (0.0111) (0.0182)  (0.0219) (0.0431) 
Total restricted -0.0301 -0.0324  -0.0296 -0.0512 (0.0244) (0.0306)  (0.0470) (0.0648) 
ΔShare of single family housing  0.0086*   0.0403*  (0.0046)   (0.0229) 
ΔNr. of rooms  -0.1901***   0.0690  (0.0428)   (0.0654) 
ΔAge  -0.0080   0.0134  (0.0064)   (0.0107) 
Constant 0.1287* 0.2484**  0.2759** 0.2043 (0.0781) (0.1254)  (0.1400) (0.2756) 
Kleibergen-Paap F 19.05 11.14  19.05 13.74 
Observations 2261 1419  2261 1419 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors are clustered at the 
municipality level. The unit of observations are obtained by partitioning the whole territory of the country in small 
square cells of 2x2 km. Total restricted area is standardized and contains all relevant constraints on the extensive 
margin – including water bodies, undevelopable land, forest, and other protected areas.  
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Table WB - 3B: Heterogeneous supply elasticities (2005-2015) - First stage of Panel B of Table 1 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level. The unit of observations are obtained by partitioning 
the whole territory of the country in small square cells of 2x2 km. Total restricted area is standardized and contains all relevant constraints on the extensive margin – including 
water bodies, undevelopable land, forest, and other protected areas. 
 
First stage 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Outcome ΔLog𝑄𝑄 Stock 1980 × ΔLog𝑄𝑄 
Total 
Restricted 
Stock× 
1980 ×
ΔLog𝑄𝑄 ΔLog𝑄𝑄 
Stock 1980 × ΔLog𝑄𝑄 
Total 
Restricted 
Stock× 
1980 ×
ΔLog𝑄𝑄 ΔLog𝑄𝑄 
Stock 1980 × ΔLog𝑄𝑄 
Total 
Restricted 
Stock× 
1980 ×
ΔLog𝑄𝑄 ΔLog𝑄𝑄 
Stock 1980 × ΔLog𝑄𝑄 
Total 
Restricted 
Stock× 
1980 ×
ΔLog𝑄𝑄 
Language 0.3118*** 0.0763 -0.1458*** 0.3878*** 0.2547*** -0.3010*** 0.3118*** 0.0763 -0.1458*** 0.3522*** 0.2375** 0.3522*** 
 (0.0327) (0.0558) (0.0470) (0.0426) (0.0941) (0.0750) (0.0327) (0.0558) (0.0470) (0.0410) (0.0924) (0.0410) 
Stock 1980 × Language -0.1074*** 0.0707 0.2543*** -0.0829*** -0.0385 0.4026*** -0.1074*** 0.0707 0.2543*** -0.0812*** -0.0380 -0.0812*** 
 (0.0189) (0.0785) (0.0712) (0.0190) (0.0883) (0.0608) (0.0189) (0.0785) (0.0712) (0.0190) (0.0876) (0.0190) 
Total 
restricted ×  
Stock 1980 × Language 
-0.0554*** -0.1423*** 0.5399*** -0.0387*** -0.1838*** 0.6151*** -0.0554*** -0.1423*** 0.5399*** -0.0338** -0.1809*** -0.0338** 
 (0.0144) (0.0506) (0.0651) (0.0125) (0.0586) (0.0659) (0.0144) (0.0506) (0.0651) (0.0134) (0.0595) (0.0134) 
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